Beware the Jabberwock: A Reply to Mr. Thomas by Brower, Charles H., II
Wayne State University
Law Faculty Research Publications Law School
1-1-2002
Beware the Jabberwock: A Reply to Mr. Thomas
Charles H. Brower II
University of Mississippi, charles.brower@wayne.edu
This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at DigitalCommons@WayneState. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Law Faculty Research Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@WayneState.
Recommended Citation
Charles H. Brower II, Beware the Jabberwock: A Reply to Mr. Thomas, 40 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 465 (2002).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/lawfrp/164
Beware the Jabberwock:
A Reply to Mr. Thomas
CHARLES H. BROWER fI*
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 465
II. METALCLAD: VILLAIN OR VICTIM? .................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 466
III. THE TRIBUNAL: RUNNING AMOK OR WITH THE PACK? ......... 467
IV. THE ANNULMENT PROCEEDINGS: NONCOMMERCIAL OR
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION? ........................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471
V. THE ANNULMENT PROCEEDINGS: DEFERENTIAL OR
INTRUSIVE REVIEW? ................................ .. .. .. .. .. . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . .. . 476
VI. HEIGHTENED JUDICIAL REVIEW: "CLEARLY INCOMPATIBLE"
WITH THE OBLIGATIONS OF CHAPTER 11 ............................... 479
VII. THE INTOXICATING PROPERTIES OF SOVEREIGN POWER ....... 484
I. INTRODUCTION
J.C. Thomas sets forth an interesting tale, in which the
Metalclad Corporation is aware of (but ignores) the need to secure a
construction permit from the municipal government of Guadalcazar, a
chapter 11 tribunal runs completely amok and imposes an
unprecedented obligation on Mexico to ensure the success of
Metalclad's investment, observers reach a general consensus that
chapter 11 disputes fall outside the legal framework of commercial
arbitration, the Supreme Court of British Columbia renders a
deferential and unremarkable judgment during the annulment
proceedings, and I argue that Canada bears responsibility for a "gross
injustice" involving a "flagrant and inexcusable violation of
municipal law." Although it represents a notable lesson in advocacy,
this account does not withstand scrutiny.
* Croft Assistant Professor of International Law and Jessie D. Puckett, Jr. Lecturer in
Law, University of Mississippi School of Law. The author received helpful comments from
Judge Charles N. Brower and Professor Jack J. Coe, Jr. The author bears sole responsibility
for remaining blunders.
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II. METALCLAD: VILLAIN OR VICTIM?
In laying out the factual background for his -response, Mr.
Thomas states that Metaiclad was "fully aware" of the need to secure
a construction permit from municipal authorities in Guadalcazar,
Metaiclad consciously decided to "ignore the problem," and the
arbitral tribunal overlooked this information.' In my view, these
statements are as improper as they are inaccurate. Because the
arbitral award conclusively established the relevant facts, the Supreme
Court of British Columbia recognized that independent evaluation of
the facts "would not be appropriate" at this stage.
2
Turning to the award, one finds a concise statement of relevant
findings. First, Mexican federal officials "assured" Metalclad that it
had all permits necessary "to undertake the landfill project.",3 Second,
"Metalclad was led to believe, and did believe, that the federal and
state permits allowed for construction and operation of the landfill. '4
Third, "[r]elying on the representations of the federal government,
Metalclad started constructing the landfill."5 Fourth, "Metalclad was
entitled to rely on the representations of federal officials and to
believe that it was entitled to continue its construction of the
landfill."6 Fifth, "there was no evidence that the Municipality ever
required or issued a construction permit for any other construction
project in Guadalcazar." 7 Sixth, after demanding that Metalclad apply
for a construction permit, municipal authorities in Guadalcazar denied
the application at a meeting "of which Metalclad received no notice,
to which it received no invitation, and at which it was given no
opportunity to appear." 8 Seventh, the municipal authorities denied
Metalclad's request for a construction permit without citing any
construction defects. 9  Eighth, denial of the construction permit
1. J.C. Thomas, A Reply to Professor Brower, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 433, 439,
440 (2002).
2. See Reasons for Judgment of Hon. Mr. Justice Tysoe, United Mexican States v.
Metalclad Corp. at para. 2 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 2001), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/
tna-nac/trans-2may.pdf.
3. See Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Award (Aug. 30, 2000) at para. 80 (NAFTAIICSID
Add'l Facility), available at http://www.pearcelaw.com/metalclad.html.
4. Id. at para. 85.
5. Id. at para. 87.
6. Id. at para. 89.
7. Id. at para. 52.
8. Id. at para. 91.
9. Id. at para. 92.
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"effectively and unlawfully prevented [Metalclad's] operation of the
landfill.' Ninth, following the commencement of arbitral
proceedings, the outgoing governor of the relevant Mexican state
decreed the site to be part of an ecological preserve, which "barrled]
forever the operation of the landfill."" The award's brief and
trenchant presentation of facts may lack political sensitivity, but its
findings provide the conclusive background for legal analysis.
III. THE TRIBUNAL: RUNNING AMOK OR WITH THE PACK?
Mr. Thomas implies that the Metalclad tribunal exceeded the
scope of its jurisdiction by unlawfully transforming the case into a
chapter 18 claim and by construing articles 1802 and 102 to create an
obligation for Mexico to ensure the successful implementation of
individual investments. 12 Curiously, he offers no general explanation
of how tribunals determine their jurisdiction or interpret the
substantive obligations of chapter 11. Had he done- so, the award
would make considerably more sense, and his jurisdictional
objections would vanish.
It is common ground that articles 1116 and 1117 limit the
jurisdiction of chapter 11 tribunals to "claims" that a NAFTA Party
has breached a legal obligation set forth in section A of chapter 11.
To establish jurisdiction, chapter 11 tribunals need only determine
that "claims" depend for support on the provisions of section A.
14
Thus, whenever investors claim that their host states have breached
specified provisions of section A, tribunals must exercise jurisdiction
10. Id.atpara.106.
11. Id. atpara. 109.
12. Thomas, supra note 1, at 437-38 (particularly text accompanying note 23).
13. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., arts. 1116,
1117, 32 I.L.M. 605, 642-43 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
14. See Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction (June 24, 1998) at para. 61
(NAFTA/UNCITRAL), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 708, 724-25 (1999) (quoting Ambatielos Case
(Greece v. United Kingdom), 1953 I.C.J. Rep. 10, 18-19 (May 19)). See also Pope & Talbot
v. Canada, Award in Relation to the Preliminary Motion by the Government of Canada (Jan.
26, 2000) at paras. 23-25 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL), available at http://www.appletonlaw.
com/4b3P&T.htm.
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and consider the merits. 15 If the claims turn out to rely on unfounded
interpretations of the provisions set forth in section A, tribunals do not
lose jurisdiction-they issue awards denying the claims on their legal
merits. 16 As recognized by virtually everyone (including Thomas 17
and the Supreme Court of British Columbia18), Metalclad claimed that
the arbitrary and misleading actions of federal, state, and local
authorities created a non-transparent environment that was
incompatible with Mexico's obligation under article 1105(1) to
provide "treatment in accordance with international law, including
fair and equitable treatment." Because that claim alleged a violation
of section A, it clearly fell within the tribunal's jurisdiction. 19
Metalclad's interpretation of "fair and equitable treatment" to include
a requirement of transparency represented an issue that the tribunal
could resolve only through consideration of the legal merits.
According to Thomas, the tribunal "began" its consideration of
the merits by "first cit[ing] an article found in chapter 18 rather than
chapter 11."20 To the contrary, the tribunal first cited article 1131(1),
which establishes the governing law for chapter 11 disputes and
requires tribunals to "decide the issues . . . in accordance with
[NAFTA] and applicable rules of international law.",21 Those rules
include the principles set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, which require interpretation of treaty provisions in the
15. See Ethyl Corp., Award on Jurisdiction (June 24, 1998) at para. 61, reprinted in 38
I.L.M. at 724-25 (explaining that "the fact that a claim purporting to be based on a Treaty
may eventually be found... to be unsupportable under the Treaty, does not of itself remove
the claim from the category of claims which, for the purposes of arbitration, should be
regarded as falling within" the tribunal's jurisdiction). See also Pope & Talbot, Award in
Relation to the Preliminary Motion by the Government of Canada (Jan. 26, 2000) at para. 25
("The Investor claims breaches of specified obligations.., which fall within the provisions
of Section A of Chapter 11 .... Whether or not the claims of the Investor will turn out to be
well founded in fact or law, at the present stage it cannot be stated that there are not
investment disputes before the Tribunal.").
16. See Azinian v. Mexico, Award (Nov. 1, 1999) at para. 91 (NAFTA/JICSID Add'l
Facility) ("It is therefore necessary to examine whether the annulment of the Concession
Contract may be considered to be an act of expropriation violating NAFTA Article 1110. If
not, the claim must fail."), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm.
17. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 436-37.
18. See Reasons for Judgment of Hon. Mr. Justice Tysoe, United Mexican States v.
Metalclad Corp. at paras. 66, 70, 75 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 2001), available at http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/trans-2may.pdf.
19. See Azinian, Award (Nov. 1, 1999) at para. 81 ("Section A of Chapter Eleven
establishes a number of substantive obligations with respect to investments. Section B
concerns jurisdiction. . .") (emphasis added).
20. Thomas, supra note 1, at 438.
21. See Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Award (Aug. 30, 2000) at para. 70 (NAFTA/ICSID
Add'l Facility), available at http://www.pearcelaw.com/metalclad.html.
[40:465
BEWARE THE JABBER WOCK
context and in light of the treaty's object and purpose.22 Thus, a
tribunal must consider the treaty text, the preambles and annexes,
related and contemporaneous agreements between the parties, and all
rules of international law applicable to relations between the parties.
23
Consistent with this obligation, the Metalclad tribunal did not
interpret article 1105(1) in a vacuum; instead it consulted other
NAFTA provisions that supply the necessary context for
understanding vague terms like "fairness" and "equity." In short, the
tribunal did not begin its analysis of the merits with an unauthorized
frolic through irrelevant chapters of NAFTA; it identified the
applicable law and then performed a mandatory review of the
interpretive context for chapter 11.
Upon examination of the interpretive context, the tribunal found a
pervasive concern for transparency. In the Preamble, the NAFTA
Parties undertake to "ENSURE a predictable commercial framework
for business planning and investment." 24  Likewise, article 102(1)
states that an objective of NAFTA is to "increase substantially
investment opportunities" and article 102(1) cites "transparency" as a
principle that elaborates NAFTA's objectives.2 ' Finally, the tribunal
observed that article 1802(1) requires each party to "ensure that its
laws, regulations, procedures, and administrative rulings of general
application respecting any matter covered by [NAFTA] are promptly
... made available in such a manner as to enable interested persons
and Parties to become acquainted with them."2 6  Given their
ubiquitous role within the interpretive context for article 1105,
principles of transparency naturally assumed a central role in the
22. See id. See also Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Decision on Hearing of
Respondent's Objection to Competence and Jurisdiction (Jan. 5, 2001) at paras. 50-51
(NAFTA/ICSID Add'l Facility), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com; S.D. Myers, Inc.
v. Canada, Partial Award (Nov. 13, 2000) at paras. 196-204 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL),
available at http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b2myers.htm; Waste Management, Inc. v.
Mexico, Award (June 2, 2000) at § 9 (NAFTA/ICSID Add'l Facility), available at
http:lwww.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm; Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Award on
Jurisdiction (June 24, 1998) at paras. 55-56 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL), reprinted in 38 I.L.M.
708, 723-24 (1999).
23. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1)-(3), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27; Metalclad v. Mexico, Award (Aug. 30, 2000) at
para. 70. See also Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Decision on Hearing of
Respondent's Objection to Competence and Jurisdiction (Jan. 5, 2001) at para. 51; S.D.
Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award (Nov. 13, 2000) at paras. 196-204.
24. NAFTA, supra note 13, preamble, 32 I.L.M. at 297; Metalcald Corp. v. Mexico,
Award (Aug. 30, 2000) at para. 71.
25. NAFTA, supra note 13, art. 102(1)(c), 32 I.L.M. at 297; Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico,
Award (Aug. 30, 2000) at para. 70.
26. NAFTA, supra note 13, art. 1802(1), 32 I.L.M. at 681; Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico,
Award (Aug. 30, 2000) at para. 71.
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tribunal's analysis of Metalclad's claim for the denial of "fair and
equitable treatment." Furthermore, by identifying "transparency" as
an element of "fair and equitable treatment," the Metalclad tribunal
joined a distinguished group of publicists, 27 jurists28 and international
organizations2 that have made the same determination. Again, the
Metalclad tribunal did not frolic through the text of NAFTA oblivious
to jurisdiction; it conducted a principled examination of the applicable
law and reached an unremarkable conclusion on the merits.
Without commenting on the jurisdictional import of his
allegations, I cannot accept Thomas' claim that the Metalclad tribunal
imposed a general "obligation . . . to 'ensure the successful
implementation of [particular foreign] investments.""'3  To the
contrary, the tribunal stated that "[a]n underlying objective of NAFTA
is to promote and increase cross-border investment opportunities and
ensure the successful implementation of investment initiatives.
'
"
31
Thus, the tribunal did not refer to "successful implementation of
investments,"32 but to "successful implementation of investment
27. See Daniel M. Price, Some Observations on Chapter Eleven of NAFTA, 23
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 421, 423-24 (2001) (concluding that "fair and equitable
treatment" requires host states to deal "transparently in their relations with foreigners");
Giorgio Sacerdoti, Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment Protection,
269 RECUEIL DES COEauS 251, 344 n.150 (1997) (explaining that "fair and equitable
treatment" under the Lom6 Convention requires that "all rules and practices affecting an
investor's interest be transparent, predictable, and non-discriminatory"). Mr. Price served as
the principal U.S. negotiator of chapter 11, and Sacerdoti serves as a judge on the WTO
Appellate Body.
28. See United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Oct.
12, 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R at paras. 180-84 (holding that a regulatory system lacked
transparency-and thus constituted a form of "arbitrary discrimination"-because it denied
individual applications without notice, an opportunity to be heard, or the provision of
reasoned, written decisions), available at 1998 WL 720123, at *53-*55. See also S.D.
Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award (Nov. 12, 2000) (separate opinion of Bryan Schwartz)
at paras. 254-58 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL) (observing that it would "appear sensible" to
include principles of transparency in the definition of "fair and equitable treatment" but
declining to draw a "definitive" conclusion because the parties did not fully brief the issue),
available at http://www.appletonlaw.cm/4b2myers.htm; Owners of the Tattler (United States)
v. Great Britain, 6 R.I.A.A. 48, 49-51 (1920) (imposing liability due to a lack of clarity in
Canadian laws regarding licenses for U.S. fishing vessels); William S. Dodge, International
Decision, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 910, 918 (2001) (observing that "arbitrators have based
international responsibility on a lack of transparency in a number of prior decisions").
29. World Bank, Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment at 111.2,
111.8, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1379, 1381-82 (1992) (requiring "fair and equitable treatment
according to the standards recommended in these Guidelines" and specifically calling for
promotion of "transparency in... dealings with foreign investors").
30. Thomas, supra note 1, at 438 (emphasis added).
31. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Award (Aug. 30, 2000) at par. 75 (emphasis added).
32. Thomas, supra note 1, at 438 (particularly text accompanying note 24).
[40:465
BEWARE THE JABBERWOCK
initiatives" (i.e., policies or programs of NAFTA Parties).33 More
importantly, the tribunal did not identify successful implementation as
a binding "obligation,"34 but as an "underlying objective"35 or goal.
Because anyone should appreciate the fundamental distinction
between obligations and objectives, I remain baffled by the statement
that the tribunal created an unprecedented obligation of result.36 In
any event, even Thomas stops short of claiming that the tribunal
actually applied any such obligation in its determination of liability.
To the contrary, he repeatedly identifies "transparency" as the
predicate for the tribunal's imposition of liability.37 Thus, as
discussed above, the predicate for liability resulted from a principled
examination of the merits, not the analytical frolic described by
Thomas.
IV. THE ANNULMENT PROCEEDINGS: NONCOMMERCIAL OR
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION?
Dissatisfied with the Metalclad award, Mexico exercised its
right to seek annulment by the Supreme Court of British Columbia.
Thomas offers a surprising explanation for the decision to seek relief
both under the International Commercial Arbitration Act (ICAA)
(British Columbia's version of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which
applies to international commercial arbitration and does not permit
review of the merits), and the Commercial Arbitration Act (CAA)
(which applies to all other arbitrations and which permits review of
the merits). He attributes this strategy to Mexico's concern that
Metalclad would argue that the award was not a commercial award,
that ICAA did not apply, and that Mexico could not proceed.38 This
"prosaic point of immense practical significance" 39 lacks credibility.
Throughout the arbitration, Metalclad relied on the ICAA to support
procedural arguments.4 0 Under the circumstances, Metalclad would
33. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Award (Aug. 30, 2000) at para. 75 (emphasis added).
34. Thomas, supra note 1, at 438.
35. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Award (Aug. 30, 2000) at para. 75 (emphasis added).
36. Thomas, supra note 1, at 438.
37. Id. at 438-39, 452-53.
38. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 442.
39. Id.
40. See Jack J. Coe, Jr., Domestic Court Control of Investment Awards-Necessary Evil
or Achilles Heel Within NAFTA and the Proposed FTAA? at 16 (2002) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author).
2002]
COL UMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W
have been inhibited (and probably estopped) from resisting
application of the ICAA. Furthermore, one cannot imagine Metalclad
arguing against application of the deferential ICAA and for an
alternative statute that contemplates judicial review of the merits.
Finally, in its submissions to the court, Mexico did not portray the
CAA as a secondary avenue to be used in the event of an ambush. To
the contrary, Mexico itself described the award as noncommercial and
petitioned the court to apply the CAA.41 Mexico did so not for
prudential or procedural reasons, but-in its own words-to "appeal"
seven "questions of law" decided by the tribunal.42
Thomas also hints at a growing agreement with the NAFTA
Parties' litigation position that chapter 11 disputes fall outside the
legal framework of commercial arbitration.43  Read carefully, his
authorities establish only that chapter 11 disputes differ from the
"ordinary,"" "usual, 45 or "standard run' 46 of commercial arbitration
between private parties. My article agrees with this limited
proposition and recognizes the unique mix of commercial (i.e.,
private) and noncommercial (i.e., public or regulatory) interests that
41. See Petitioner's Outline of Argument (Feb. 5, 2001) at paras. 131, 145-66, In re
Arbitration Pursuant to Chapter Eleven of NAFTA Between Metalclad Corp. & United
Mexican States (B.C. Sup. Ct. 2001) [hereinafter Mexico's Outline of Argument].
42. Id. at paras. 166, 523-91.
43. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 442-43, 461-62.
44. Id. at 443, 461-62.
45. Id. at 443 (quoting Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on
Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as "Amici Curiae" (Jan. 15, 2001) at para. 49
(NAFTA/UNCITRAL), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com).
Contrary to Thomas' suggestion at 441-42, the Methanex tribunal never "noted that
it was possible that chapter 11 is not a 'commercial arbitration agreement between the
investor-claimant and the respondent-party state."' Rather, the tribunal's decision only
records that the United States "noted that... Chapter 11 of NAFTA is not.., a commercial
arbitration agreement between the investor-claimant and the respondent-party state." See
Mexico's Outline of Argument, supra note 41, at para. 149 (quoting Methanex Corp. v.
United States, Decision of the Tribunal on the Place of Arbitration (Sept. 7, 2000) at para. 16
(NAFTA/UNCITRAL)). Because the United States "did not.., press" its contention, the
tribunal did not consider the matter and simply observed that the United States had raised a
"controversial" issue. See id. (quoting Methanex, Decision of the Tribunal on the Place of
Arbitration (Sept. 7, 2000) at para. 27). By labeling it as "controversial," the tribunal may
reasonably have been seen as questioning-rather than endorsing-the United States'
position on the character of investor-state arbitration.
46. Thomas, supra note 1, at 443, 462 (quoting United Parcel Serv. of America, Inc. v.
Canada, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici
Curiae (Oct. 17, 2001) at para. 70 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL), available at http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/nafta-e.asp).
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characterize investor-state arbitration. 47 While acknowledging the
presence of multiple interests in chapter 11 disputes, these
observations do not establish a general agreement about the
predominance of commercial or noncommercial attributes for
purposes of legal analysis. Rather, they suggest the need for some
principled basis on which to make that determination.
According to Thomas, the noncommercial (or public)
characteristics should predominate because chapter 11 disputes have
"public policy ramifications; ' '48 that is to say, the noncommercial
characteristics should predominate because they exist and are
important. This analysis is circular and subjective. In investor-state
arbitration, investors and states frequently disagree about the goals to
be pursued.49 Complaining investors emphasize the objective of
commercial security. In contrast, states highlight the importance of
public regulatory goals-particularly when responding to claims that
regulatory action has been taken at the expense of private interests.51
Under these circumstances, one cannot establish the predominance of
commercial or noncommercial characteristics based on perceived
importance without descending into subjective argumentation about
the underlying merits.
5 2
One must, therefore, consider objective evidence that NAFTA
contemplates the resolution of investor-state disputes within the
general legal framework of international commercial arbitration.53
This evidence includes custom, the text of NAFTA, and the relevant
state practice of the NAFTA Parties.54  Historically, investor-state
arbitration takes place within a framework that resembles
47. See Charles H. Brower II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire
Strikes Back, 40 COLuM J. TRANSNAT'L L. 43, 72 (2001). I reiterate, however, that this
represents a difference in degree rather than in kind because "ordinary" commercial
arbitrations often involve complex issues of public regulatory law. See id. at 71-72. See also
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (involving
commercial arbitration of antitrust claims).
48. Thomas, supra note 1, at 446. See also Mexico's Outline of Argument, supra note
41, at paras. 184-85.
49. See STEPHEN J. TOOPE, MIXED INTERNATiONAL ARBITRATON 394 (1990).
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See Brower, supra note 47, at 72.
53. See id.
54. By "relevant" state practice, I mean "what the parties did under the agreement
before the issue of interpretation arose." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNTrED STATES § 147 cmt. d(f) (1965) (emphasis added). That
practice has much greater evidentiary value than the litigation positions adopted after the
issue of interpretation arose.
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international commercial arbitration. 55 Thus, the ICSID Convention
"borrow[s] heavily from the structures of international commercial
arbitration. 56  Likewise, ICSID's Additional Facility Rules "are
based on... provisions of the [ICSID] Convention which lend
themselves to inclusion in an instrument of a contractual nature, and
include some provisions derived from the UNCITRAL Rules and the
ICC Rules.' In addition, the Additional Facility Rules require
arbitration to take place on the territory of a state that is a party to the
New York Convention.5 8 Because most states parties limit the scope
of the New York Convention to commercial arbitration,59 this
requirement makes no sense unless the Additional Facility Rules
contemplate a form of commercial arbitration. This customary use of
commercial arbitration models took root because it "furthers
international investment" by providing investors with access to an
efficient and predictable form of dispute resolution that produces
enforceable outcomes.
60
Several of NAFTA's objectives support the application of the
legal framework for international commercial arbitration to chapter 11
disputes. First, the NAFTA Parties undertake to "increase
substantially investment opportunities." 61  Second, they agree to
"ensure a predictable commercial framework for ... investment." 62
Third, they resolve to "create effective procedures for the . . .
55. See TOOPE, supra note 49, at 398.
56. David D. Caron, The Nature of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the
Evolving Structure of International Dispute Resolution, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 104, 154 (1990).
Professor Caron describes ICSID arbitration as an example of the "evolution from diplomatic
protection to international commercial arbitration." Id. (emphasis added). See also Ibrahim
F.I. Shihata, The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, 20 INT'L L. 485, 492 (1986)
(anticipating that MIGA contracts of guarantee would refer disputes to an "internationally
recognized body of rules for commercial arbitration, such as the ICSID arbitration rules")
(emphasis added). Mr. Shihata was Vice President and General Counsel of the World Bank.
57. Introductory Note C to the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/v.htm.
58. See ICSID Additional Facility Rules, art. 20, available at http://www.worldbank.
org/icsid/facility/41.htm.
59. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 149 (2d ed. 2001).
60. See Caron, supra note 56, at 155 (observing that the transfer of disputes to "the
more enforceable process of private international arbitration ... furthers international
investment"). Mexico has recognized that the UNCITRAL Model Law, which applies to
international commercial arbitrations in British Columbia, "promote[s] the efficient
functioning of... arbitrations" and "establish[es] a climate where international commercial
arbitration can be resorted to with confidence by parties from different countries." Mexico's
Outline of Argument, supra note 41, at paras. 122, 177.
61. NAFTA, supra note 13, art. 102(1)(c), 32 I.L.M. at 297.
62. Id., preamble, 32 I.L.M. at 297 (emphasis added).
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resolution of disputes." 63  Because international commercial
arbitration promotes investment by creating a predictable and
effective mechanism for resolving disputes, it seems well suited to the
fundamental objectives of NAFTA.64 Perhaps this explains why the
NAFTA Parties required the submission of chapter 11 disputes to
arbitration under the ICSID Convention, the Additional Facility
Rules, or the UNCITRAL Rules6 5 -all widely regarded as falling
within the broad definition of international commercial arbitration.61
Any lingering doubt should have been resolved by article 1136(7),
which provides that chapter 11 disputes "shall be considered to arise
out of a commercial relationship or transaction for purposes of... the
New York Convention and ... the Inter-American Convention.
6 7
Relevant state practice also supports treatment of chapter 11
disputes as a form of commercial arbitration. Following ratification
of NAFTA, the Canadian government amended its federal arbitration
statute to provide, "for greater certainty," that chapter 11 disputes fall
within the definition of "commercial arbitration."68 Likewise, the
Supreme Court of British Columbia has ruled that chapter 11 disputes
fall within the definition of "commercial arbitration" under the
provincial enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law.69 Furthermore,
a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit refers to NAFTA as an "international commercial agreement"
over half a dozen times.70 Finally, the principal U.S. negotiator of
chapter 11 has publicly stated that the investment regime aims to
63. Id., art. 102(1)(e), 32 I.L.M. at 297.
64. See Brett Frischmann, Using the Multi-Layered Nature of International Emissions
Trading and of International-Domestic Legal Systems to Escape a Multi-State Compliance
Dilemma, 13 GEo. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 463, 504 (2001) (explaining that chapter 11 treats
"the investor-State dispute as a commercial arbitration regime, which is particularly effective
and makes decisions of arbitration panels enforceable in domestic courts").
65. NAFTA, supra note 13, art. 1120(1), 32 IL.M. at 643.
66. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. See also Thomas, supra note 1, at
460 (acknowledging that the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules represent a set of "international
commercial arbitration rules").
67. NAFTA, supra note 13, art. 1136(7), 32 I.L.M. at 646.
68. See Reasons for Judgment of Hon. Mr. Justice Tysoe, United Mexican States v.
Metalclad Corp. at para. 48 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 2001), available at http://www.dfait-
maeci.ge.caltna-nac/trans-2may.pdf; Mexico's Outline of Argument, supra note 41, at para.
144.
69. See Reasons for Judgment of Hon. Mr. Justice Tysoe at paras. 39-49.
70. See Made in USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1302, 1313, 1316, 1318-
19 (1lth Cir. 2001).
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remove disputes from "the political realm and put them more into the
realm of commercial arbitration."
71
In short, there is no growing agreement that chapter 11
disputes fall outside the legal framework of international commercial
arbitration. Whatever the NAFTA Parties may say as litigants, the
objective evidence supports the opposite conclusion.
V. THE ANNULMENT PROCEEDINGS: DEFERENTIAL OR INTRUSIVE
REVIEW?
Thomas states that the Supreme Court of British Columbia
conducted a deferential review of the Metalclad award "with the
exception of the analysis of the jurisdictional issue and the
applicability of one arbitral authority.' 72  While true, this
juxtaposition of deferential review in some portions of the judgment
against the vigorous review undertaken elsewhere serves to highlight
the court's deep intrusion into the merits of the award.
A quick review of the ICAA helps to illustrate the point. Firs
the ICAA prohibits judicial review of awards for legal error.
Second, although the ICAA permits the annulment of awards for
excess of jurisdiction,74 the "leading ' 75 case has "emphasized ' 76 that
courts must apply a "powerful presumption" 77 that the arbitrators
71. Daniel M. Price, Chapter l-Private Party vs. Government, Investor-State Dispute
Settlement: Frankenstein or Safety Valve?, 26 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 107, 112 (2000) (emphasis
added).
72. Thomas, supra note 1, at 447 & n.61 (emphasis added).
73. See Reasons for Judgment of Hon. Mr. Justice Tysoe at paras. 50-51, 99; Mexico's
Outline of Argument, supra note 41, at par. 172.
74. See Reasons for Judgment of Hon. Mr. Justice Tysoe at paras. 50-51; Mexico's
Outline of Argument supra note 41, at paras. 168, 187.
75. See Reasons for Judgment of Hon. Mr. Justice Tysoe at para. 51 (identifying
Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp., [1991] 1 W.W.R. 219 (B.C. Ct. App.), as the
"leading British Columbia authority"); Mexico's Outline of Argument, supra note 41, at para.
171 (describing Quintette as "the leading case in British Columbia").
76. Mexico's Outline of Argument, supra note 41, at para. 180.
77. Quintette, [1991] 1 W.W.R. at 223; Mexico's Outline of Argument, supra note 41,
at para. 180. See also Transcript of Proceedings (Feb. 19, 2001) at 80-81 (argument of J.C.
Thomas) ("We're well aware... that... the Court of Appeal of British Columbia has said in
Quintette that there's a powerful presumption of jurisdiction. We take no issue with that
statement as it applies to private international commercial arbitrations."), In re Arbitration
Pursuant to Chapter Eleven of NAFTA Between Metalclad Corp. & United Mexican States
(B.C. Sup. Ct. 2001), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-
e.asp#Metalclad.
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acted within their jurisdiction. Third, challenges that arguably
involve the arbitrators' interpretations of substantive obligations do
not constitute true jurisdictional objections. 78  To the contrary, they
implicate the merits of the dispute and, therefore, constitute
unreviewable questions of law.
79
In the annulment proceedings, Mexico claimed that the
tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction when deciding that the ecological
decree constituted a measure tantamount to expropriation within the
meaning of article 1110. According to Mexico, the tribunal exceeded
its jurisdiction by adopting a broader definition of expropriation than
could be supported by the text of article 1110.80 Although the court
expressed surprise at the tribunal's "extremely broad definition of
expropriation," it held that the definition of expropriation "is a
question of law with which this Court is not entitled to interfere."
8
'
Thus, consistent with the ICAA and international practice, the court
recognized that the definition of substantive obligations does not
implicate jurisdiction, but it represents a legal question not subject to
judicial review.
Mexico also claimed that the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction
in deciding that, under the circumstances, denial of the construction
permit violated Metalclad's right to "fair and equitable treatment 8 2
and constituted an indirect expropriation.8 3  Curiously, the court did
not consider the tribunal's definition of "fair and equitable treatment"
to be a legal question, but a jurisdictional matter appropriate for
judicial intervention. 84  Furthermore, the court disregarded the
"powerful presumption" of jurisdictional propriety and reviewed the
Thomas cites Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of
Egypt, 3 ICSID Rep. 131, 143 (1988), for the proposition that "there is no presumption of
jurisdiction-particularly where a sovereign state is involved." See Thomas, supra note 1, at
462 n.109. In that case, an arbitral tribunal held that arbitral tribunals cannot presume their
own jurisdiction and must examine objections to jurisdiction. The case did not address the
issue of whether courts have an obligation to presume the validity of jurisdictional decisions
already made by tribunals. As "emphasized" by the "leading" case in British Columbia,
courts must apply a "powerful presumption" that tribunals have acted within their
jurisdiction.
78. See BoRN, supra note 59, at 853. See also infra notes 83-84 and accompanying
text.
79. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
80. See Mexico's Outline of Argument, supra note 41, at paras. 310-11, 313, 317.
81. Reasons for Judgment of Hon. Mr. Justice Tysoe at para. 99.
82. See Mexico's Outline of Argument, supra note 41, at paras. 238-73.
83. See id. at para. 303.
84. See Reasons for Judgment of Hon. Mr. Justice Tysoe at paras. 66-72.
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tribunal's definition under the standard of "lejal correctness," 85 which
means the complete absence of deference. 6  In short, the court
collapsed the merits into jurisdiction and, then, cast aside the
customary presumptions that favor enforcement. Thus unshackled,
the court conducted a six-page review of possible "interpretations" of
article 1105, stated its own views on the matter, and annulled the
tribunal's decision on "fair and equitable treatment." 87 By comparing
this analysis to the court's treatment of identical issues under article
1110,88 one may appreciate the depth of its intrusion into the merits of
the award.
Its work not yet complete, the court turned to the tribunal's
related determination that, under the circumstances, denial of the
construction permit also constituted an indirect expropriation. 89 In so
doing, the court held that the tribunal's discussion of transparency
under article 1105 "infected" its analysis of expropriation under
article 1110.90 This did not, however, provide sufficient justification
for annulment because the tribunal also relied on the arbitral award in
Biloune v. Ghana Invs. Cr. (a case that did not involve the concept of
transparency).91 The court made quick work of this obstacle by
noting "substantial differences" between the "circumstances" in
Metalclad and Biloune.92 Because the "circumstances" of Metalclad
fell "considerably short of those in Biloune," the court held they could
not justify the tribunal's conclusions regarding expropriation. Here,
the court could not rest its decision on a purported jurisdictional
defect because Mexico's pleadings discussed Biloune only in a
85. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 447. To support the application of the "legal
correctness" standard, Thomas cites two Canadian cases that antedate Quintette (which was
thefirst-and remains the leading-decision interpreting the relevant provision of the ICAA)
and a case from Hong Kong. These cases provide no basis for disregarding the ICAA's
"powerful presumption" of jurisdictional propriety. See supra notes 75-77 and
accompanying text.
86. See Mexico's Outline of Argument, supra note 41, at para. 207 ("Where the
standard of review is correctness, the tribunal is not entitled to any deference whatsoever....
The Court is entitled to substitute its own views for those of the original decision-maker.");
Thomas, supra note 1, at 447 (explaining that the "correctness standard" permits a reviewing
court to "substitute its view for that of the tribunal").
87. See Reasons for Judgment of Hon. Mr. Justice Tysoe at paras. 61-75.
88. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
89. See Reasons for Judgment of Hon. Mr. Justice Tysoe at paras. 77-80.
90. Id. at para. 78.
91. See id. at para. 80; Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Award (Aug. 30, 2000) at para. 108
(NAFTA/ICSID Add'l Facility), available at http://www.pearcelaw.com/metalclad.html.
92. Reasons for Judgment of Hon. Mr. Justice Tysoe at para. 80.
93. Id.
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section that identified seven "errors of law."94 Simply put, the court
granted this part of Mexico's "appeal" 95 and reversed the tribunal's
application of precedent.
In short, I agree that portions of the court's judgment represent
a model of deferential review. However, they serve only to
emphasize the deep incursions into the merits committed elsewhere.
Overall, "the case may lead one to wonder whether it is appropriate to
allow national courts to review chapter 11 awards."
96
VI. HEIGHTENED JUDIcIAL REvIEw: "CLEARLY INCOMPATIBLE"
WITH THE OBLIGATIONS OF CHAPTER 11
In the final pages of his response, Mr. Thomas suggests that I
contend that (1) the judgment of the Supreme Court of British
Columbia violates "Canadian law" and (2) Canada bears international
responsibility under chapter 11 for the violation of "Canadian law."
97
Thomas then identifies the circumstances under which international
tribunals will impose liability for violations of municipal law: the
violations of municipal law must be "flagrant and inexcusable," must
involve an element of discrimination or bad faith, and must produce
"gross injustices."98 So posited, the underlying thesis fails.
The problem is that Thomas does not accurately capture my
central thesis. I argue not that the Supreme Court of British Columbia
violated "Canadian law" so egregiously as to constitute a denial of
justice. My central thesis is that heightened judicial review of chapter
11 awards violates specific rules of international law, including the
NAFTA Parties' commitment under chapter 11 to the "settlement 99
of investor-state disputes through "final" 100  and "binding"''1 1
arbitration.
94. See Mexico's Outline of Argument, supra note 41, at paras. 166, 523, 562-66.
95. See id. at paras. 166, 523.
96. Dodge, supra note 28, at 916.
97. Thomas, supra note 1, at 456-57.
98. Id.
99. NAFTA, supra note 13, art. 1115, 32 I.L.M. at 642.
100. Id., arts. 1135, 1136, 32 I.L.M. at 646 (referring to the awards of chapter 11
tribunals as "final" awards).
101. Id., art. 1136(1) (providing that the awards of chapter 11 tribunals shall be
"binding" between the disputing parties and in respect of the particular case).
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Having consulted the work of Dr. Eduardo Jim~nez de
Ar~chaga, Thomas presumably knows that states bear international
responsibility for all "judicial decisions which constitute direct
breaches of international law."' 10 2 These include, by way of example,
judicial decisions that (1) exceed the limits on territorial jurisdiction
set by international law or (2) treat fugitive offenders "contrary to a
provision of an extradition treaty." 103 In such matters, claimants need
not show "gross injustices," discrimination, bad faith, or "flagrant and
inexcusable" violations of municipal law; they need only show that
the judicial decisions are "clearly incompatible with a rule of
international law."
10 4
These views are not controversial. A former judge of the
International Court of Justice maintains that the "judgment of a
municipal court which gives rise to the responsibility of a State by a
denial of justice does have an international character when, for
instance, a court... applies a rule of domestic law which is itself
contrary to international law."' 0 5  In chapter 11 disputes involving
consideration of judicial decisions, two tribunals adopted the same
standard: "What must be shown is that the court decision itself
constitutes a violation of the treaty."'1 6 Notably absent from these
declarations is any mention of the need to show "gross injustices" or
"flagrant and inexcusable" violations of international law.
To dispel any remaining doubt about the proper standard, one
need only consult Iran v. United States. 0 7 Pursuant to the Algiers
Accords, Iran agreed inter alia to arbitrate claims brought by U.S.
nationals against Iran for certain violations of municipal and
international law, as well as certain claims between Iran and the
United States. Specifically, the two states agreed to "final and
binding" 10 8 arbitration before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
102. Eduardo Jimdnez de Ardchaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century,
159 RECUBIL DES CouRs 1,279 (1978).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 158 (Feb. 5)
(separate opinion of Judge Tanaka). See also LORD ARNOLD MCNAiR, THE LAW OF TREATES
346 (1961) ("[I]f... the courts.., decline to give effect to the treaty ... , their judgments
involve the State in a breach of treaty.").
106. Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Decision on Hearing of Respondent's
Objection to Competence and Jurisdiction (Jan. 5, 2001) at para. 48 (NAFTA/ICSID Add'l
Facility), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com; Azinian v. Mexico, Award (Nov. 1,
1999) at para. 99 (NAFTA/ICSID Add'l Facility), available at http://www.worldbank.org/
icsid/cases/awards.htm.
107. See Iran v. United States, para. 44, 1998 WL 1157733.
108. See id. at paras. 63, 69.
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and to enforce the resulting awards "in accordance with national
laws."'10 9 After the Tribunal granted Iran some $3.5 million on its
counterclaim against the Avco Corporation, Iran sought enforcement
of the award in the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut. 110 The district court denied enforcement and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 111 Citing
article V(1)(b) of the New York Convention, the Second Circuit
concluded that the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal had denied Avco an
opportunity to present its case. 112 Iran then brought a new claim
before the tribunal, alleging that the judicial decisions revisited
matters decided by the tribunal, breached the treaty-based regime of
"final and binding" arbitration, and implicated the responsibility of
the United States." 3  The United States defended, in part, on the
grounds that the Algiers Accords only required enforcement of "final
and binding" awards "in accordance with national laws."'114 Since its
federal courts had acted in accordance with U.S. law, the .United
States could not be liable."
15
While recognizing that the United States had "considerable
latitude" to prescribe the mechanisms for enforcement, the tribunal
held that the United States had to exercise that discretion within
limits. 16 Specifically, the United States had to respect the "final and
binding" nature of Tribunal awards." 7  This "rule[d] out the
possibility of readjudication of the merits of Tribunal awards by a
municipal court, either under the guise of article V of the New York
Convention or by any other means." 118 Turning to the substance of
the claim, the tribunal held:
The Second Circuit ... reconsidered a specific
question raised and conclusively decided by the
Tribunal; in effect, the Second Circuit repudiated the
merits of the Tribunal's award in Avco.
109. See id. at para. 44.
110. See Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 142 (2d Cir. 1992).
111. See id. at 145-46.
112. See id.
113. See Iran v. United States, para. 31, 1998 WL 1157733.
114. Seeid. atparas. 42-44.
115. Seeid.
116. Seeid. atpara. 59.
117. Seeid. atpara. 63.
118. See1d.
2002]
COL UMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW
By reconsidering an issue that already had been aired
and decided by the Tribunal, the Second Circuit, in
violation of [the Algiers Accords], failed to treat that
Tribunal's decision as "final and binding" ....
In other words, a party... cannot evade findings made
by the Tribunal by relitigating them in an enforcing
court. The Claims Settlement Declaration requires the
States Parties to stand behind the Tribunal's findings
and makes them liable if their courts second-guess
decisions the Tribunal has made .... 119
Without belaboring the point, the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal imposed liability without any discussion of "gross
injustices" or "flagrant and inexcusable" violations of law. Rather, it
imposed liability because the United States violated a treaty-based
regime of "final and binding" arbitration by allowing its courts to
"second-guess" the merits of an award.
It is only necessary to posit this test to prove my thesis. In
ratifying NAFTA, Canada agreed to an arbitral regime that would
accomplish the "settlement ' 0 of investor-state disputes through
"final" 21 and "binding" 122 arbitration, subject to the possibility of
"annulment" or "revision" (but not "appeal"). 123 This rules out any
readjudication of the merits by a municipal court. The Supreme Court
of British Columbia rendered a judgment that second-guessed the
substantive decisions of the Metalclad tribunal. 24 Thomas admits
this, at least with respect to the court's analysis of Biloune.12 5 By
second-guessing the merits, the court violated Canada's commitment
to "final" and "binding" arbitration under chapter 11.
My principal article also examines the subsidiary issue of
whether NAFTA Parties will escape the imposition of liability for
119. Seeid. atparas.68-70.
120. NAFTA, supra note 13, art. 1115, 32 I.L.M. at 642.
121. Id., arts. 1135, 1136, 32 I.L.M. at 646 (referring to the awards of chapter 11
tribunals as "final" awards).
122. Id., art. 1136(1) (providing that the awards of chapter 11 tribunals shall be
"binding" between the disputing parties and in respect of the particular case).
123. Id., art. 1136(3)(b). As stated in my principal article, "revision" and "annulment"
have established legal meanings that fall considerably short of an "appeal." See Brower,
supra note 47, at 76, n.207.
124. See supra notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
125. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 447 & n.61. See also Mexico's Outline of Argument,
supra note 41 at paras. 166, 523, 562-66 (discussing Biloune in connection with Mexico's
"appeal" on seven "errors of law").
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unlawful conduct, or whether circumstances could ever permit
investors to use heightened review of chapter 11 awards as the
predicate for new chapter 11 claims. 126 On this point, my principal
article discusses the many obstacles that investors face and identifies
a low probability of success. 12 7  Nevertheless, under the right
circumstances, I believe that heightened review of chapter 11 awards
may provide the basis for a new chapter 11 claim. Assuming that
investors have standing, 128 they need only show a violation of any
obligation set forth in section A of chapter 11. Heightened judicial
review of chapter 11 awards may violate the obligations of "fair and
equitable treatment, ' 129 Cnational treatment," or "most-favored-nationtreatment." 130 It may also constitute a "denial of justice" according to
126. My principal thesis is that heightened judicial review of chapter II awards violates
the treaty commitment to settle investor-state disputes through final and binding arbitration.
The capacity (or incapacity) of investors to seek direct redress for violation of that treaty
obligation represents a subsidiary concern, but remains important because the absence of a
mechanism to correct treaty violations undermines the rule of law in international economic
relations. See C. WELFRED JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 757
(1964) (arguing that "institutional arrangements not grounded in respect for law are a mas[k]
for arbitrary power, incapable of organic growth into a lasting political order"); SIR IERSCH
LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMuNITY 424 (1966)
(explaining that the absence of impartial tribunals to adjudicate disputes about the operation
of legal rules "seriously impairs their character as rules of law").
127. See Brower, supra note 47, at 81-85.
128. See id. at 82 (discussing the problem of standing).
129. For example, in a decision cited with approval by the Supreme Court of British
Columbia, a chapter 11 tribunal held that a host state's breach of a rule of international law
(including treaty law) "that is specifically designed to protect investors will tend to weigh
heavily in favour of finding a breach of [fair and equitable treatment under] Article 1105."
See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award (Nov. 13, 2000) at paras. 262-66
(NAFTA/UNCITRAL), available at http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b2myers.htm. See also
Reasons for Judgment of Hon. Mr. Justice Tysoe, United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp.
at paras. 62-63 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 2001) (indicating that the S.D. Myers tribunal adopted the
"proper" and "correct" understanding of Article 1105), available at http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nae/trans-2may.pdf. This analysis enjoys the support of other highly
qualified publicists. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INSTrrUTIONs 472-73 (1995) (stating, in the context of international investment law, that
treaty violations clearly constitute actionable violations of fairness).
Because the commitment to settle investor-state disputes through "final" and
"binding" arbitration is specifically designed to protect investors, its breach weighs heavily in
favor of finding a denial of fair and equitable treatment.
130. By definition, when courts perform "heightened" judicial review of chapter 11
awards, investors do not receive the best treatment available to people in like circumstances.
Depending on the nationality of those who receive "normal" judicial review under the ICAA,
"heightened" review constitutes a prima facie denial of national treatment (Article 1102) or
most-favored-nation treatment (Article 1103). See Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award on the
Merits of Phase 2 (Apr. 10, 2000) at paras. 78-79 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL) (holding that
"differences in treatment.., presumptively violate Article 1102(2), unless they have a
reasonable justified nexus to rational government policies that (1) do not distinguish, on their
face or defacto, between foreign-owned and domestic companies, and (2) do not otherwise
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the definition adopted by Judge Tanaka in Barcelona Traction.13
Under these circumstances, I think it possible for certain investors
tenably to claim that heightened judicial review of chapter 11 awards
constitutes an independent violation of international law capable of
submission to investor-state arbitration under chapter 11 of NAFTA.
In his conclusion, Thomas asks whether it is "necessary to go
so far as to allege the 'heightened' judicial review [of chapter 11
awards] amounts to... an independent breach of the NAFTA."'132
The authorities indicate that judicial "second-guessing" of legal and
factual determinations made in chapter 11 awards violates the
commitment to settle investor-state disputes through "final" and
"binding" arbitration. Whether or not investors succeed in making it
the predicate for new claims, it is necessary for the NAFTA Parties to
recognize the unlawful character and potential consequences of
heightened review.
VII. THE INTOXICATING PROPERTIES OF SOVEREIGN POWER
Thomas repeatedly expresses confidence that judicial review
of chapter 11 awards will "contribute to" the operation of NAFTA
and the development of international economic law.133 By definition,
however, municipal courts cannot "contribute to" the development of
international economic law without systematically reviewin the legal
analyses performed by arbitrators in chapter 11 disputes.734  Thus,
despite his protestations to the contrary, Thomas endorses de novo
review of awards in annulment proceedings before municipal courts
as a tool to control the substantive outcome of investor-state
arbitration. To call his enthusiasm for this process "chilling" would
be no exaggeration.
One merely needs to follow recent developments to recognize
the inevitable consequences of heightened review. Following the
Metalclad judgment, at least one chapter 11 claimant sought to
unduly undermine the investment liberalizing objectives of NAFTA") (emphasis added),
available at http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b3P&T.htm.
131. See Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 158
(Feb. 5) (separate opinion of Judge Tanaka) (explaining that the "judgment of a municipal
court which gives rise to the responsibility of a State by a denial of justice does have an
international character when, for instance, a court... applies a rule of domestic law which is
itself contrary to international law") (emphasis added).
132. Thomas, supra note 1, at 460.
133. Id. at 444, 463.
134. See Coe, supra note 40, at 26; Dodge, supra note 28, at 916.
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prevent selection of British Columbia as the seat of arbitration. 135
Likewise, a chapter 11 tribunal declined to select Ottawa, Toronto,
Montreal, or Vancouver as the seat of arbitration, in part because it
was "troubled" by the Canadian government's support for de novo
review of the Metalclad award.136 More broadly, an arbitrator sitting
in another chapter 11 dispute warned that "[if] every decision lost by
a government is challenged in court ... and if the courts entertain
review on the merits, the efficacy of the chapter 11 process will be
seriously damaged, and [the NAFTA Parties] may weaken respect for
[investor-state arbitration] worldwide."' 137
Unfortunately, heightened judicial review represents only one
of two means recently adopted by the NAFTA Parties to assert control
over the chapter 11 process, to purge their responsibility for liabilities
already imposed, and to immunize themselves against the prospect of
liability in pending matters. On July 31, the trade ministers of
Canada, Mexico, and the United States adopted certain Notes of
Interpretation regarding the obligation under article 1105(1) to treat
NAFTA investors "in accordance with international law," which
involves affording them "fair and equitable treatment."'
138
When read in light of the NAFTA Parties' litigation positions,
the Notes seem to reduce article 1105(1) to the customary
international law prohibition of egregious, outrageous, or shocking
governmental conduct.139  Furthermore, the NAFTA Parties assert
that the Notes govern the outcome of claims that antedate July 31,140
even in cases where tribunals have already rendered partial-final
awards on liability. 14 1
135. See Coe, supra note 40, at 22, n.97.
136. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada, Decision of the Tribunal on the Place of
Arbitration (Oct. 17, 2001) at paras. 1, 8, 11, 16-19 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL), available at
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/nafta-e.asp.
137. David A. Gantz, Reconciling Environmental Protection and Investor Rights Under
Chapter 11 of NAFTA, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10646, 10667 (June 2001),
available in WESTLAW, 31 ELR 10646, 10677. Professor Gantz currently serves as an
arbitrator in Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1.
138. Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, July 31, 2001, § B
[hereinafter Notes], available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.caltna-nac/NAFTA-Interpr-e.asp.
139. See id. (limiting the scope of Article 1105(1) to "customary international law"). See
also Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2 (Apr. 10, 2000) at paras. 108-
09, 118 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL) (recounting Canada's arguments that Article 1105 only
incorporates the customary international law prohibition of egregious, outrageous or shocking
governmental conduct), available at http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b3P&T.htm.
140. Thomas, supra note 1, at 455.
141. The author is informed of Canada's position that the Notes require the Pope &
Talbot tribunal to revisit its partial-final award of Apr. 10, 2001.
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Because the limitations of time and space preclude
comprehensive analysis I must focus on the application of the Notes
to pending disputes. 142  While chapter 11 provides no explicit
guidance on this issue, article 1131(1) requires tribunals to "decide
the issues ... in accordance with.., applicable rules of international
law."' 143 Those rules include two fundamental tenets of procedural
justice: (1) equal treatment of the parties, 144 and (2) the principle that
"no one may be the judge of his own cause."'145 The NAFTA Parties'
use of interpretive statements to determine the outcome of pending
disputes in which they have demonstrable interests violates these
tenets of procedural justice and undermines the rule of law. 146
In early 2001, Canada's Minister of International Trade (the
Honorable Pierre Pettigrew) "stated repeatedly that Canada is so
dissatisfied with chapter 11 that it could never accept a similar clause
as part of a hemisphere-wide Free Trade Area of the Americas."'147 In
the wake of the Metalclad judgment and adoption of the Notes,
Pettigrew has become an enthusiastic supporter of chapter 11,
referring to it as the embodiment of "basic tenets that most Canadians
firmly believe in," which "protect the flow of trade ... for everyone's
benefit" and hold the "key to increasing ...productivity and ...
prosperity" in North America. 148 Clearly, heightened judicial review
142. I reiterate my position that the Notes constitute an ultra vires attempt to amend
Article 1105(1). Sir Robert Jennings, former President of the International Court of Justice,
reportedly characterized the Notes as "a d~marche intended to apply pressure on the
tribunal... by amending the treaty to curtail investor protections." See Claimant's Letter
Brief at 20 (Sept. 18, 2001), Methanex Corp. v. United States (NAFTAIUNCITRAL)
(quoting an enclosed expert opinion of Sir Robert Jennings [hereinafter Jennings Opinion])
(emphasis added), available as "Methanex Post-Hearing Submission on FTC Interpretation
ofArticle 1105" at http://www.state.gov/s/l/c5823.htm.
143. NAFTA, supra note 13, art. 1131(1), 32 I.L.M. at 645.
144. See Charles H. Brower II, International Immunities: Some Dissident Views on the
Role of Municipal Courts, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 87 (2000). See also Pope & Talbot Inc. v.
Canada, Decision by Tribunal (Sept. 6, 2000) at para. 1.5 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL) (identifying
equality of treatment as an "overriding principle" in NAFTA arbitrations conducted under the
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and retroactive interpretive statements have intoxicating properties.
But, make no mistake, they emanate from the elevation of sovereign
power over individual economic rights and the rule of law. I fear that
the enchanting sensation will prove both addictive and unhealthy for
the NAFTA Parties.
